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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the current debate on the state of economics from 
a methodological perspective. We claim that the majority of contributions criticizing modern 
economics are not based on clear methodological principles and thus many of them are not 
correct. We show this with respect to such issues as the problem of realisticness of models and 
their assumptions, the role of mathematics in economics, the way we conceptualize the relation 
between economics (theory) and economy (empiria), as well as the general problem of comparing 
theories. In doing so we use the research apparatus taken form the philosophy of science and also 
we benefit a lot from recent developments in the philosophy of economics. Finally, we show one of 
the paradoxes of that debate, namely that many critics of economics accuse economists of using the 
wrong language (mathematics) while they do not use proper language themselves while criticizing 
economics, namely the apparatus taken from the philosophy of science. 
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1. Introduction
Studies on the interplay between language and reality became increasingly popular in the 
methodology of social sciences in the 20th century. However, this was not the case in economics. 
By shifting into a mathematical science in the 2nd half of the 20th century, economics became 
resilient to those types of criticism which essentially transformed other social sciences in the latter 
decades of the 20th century, which in turn were stimulated mainly by the emergence of questions 
regarding the relationship between the narration (language) and the empiria (reality) described in 
modern philosophy (e.g. in the Wittgensteinian tradition). Since mathematics became the language 
of economics, neither a linguistic nor a sociological turn could essentially affect the methods of 
conducting economic research, or the status of the theory of economics itself (Backhouse et al. 
1993). Therefore, methodological studies became far less popular in economics than in other social 
sciences (Mäki 2008). At the time when the problem of relating language to reality was absorbed by 
sociologists, psychologists, historians, political scientists and others, the general conviction among 
economists was that these “philosophical” problems do not apply to their discipline and that the 
research structure of economics successfully describes increasingly larger areas of reality. That, in 
effect, led to a unique imperialism and expansionism of economics (Lazear 2000).1
A methodological reflection on the state of economics is important, because it was the language 
of economics that was mainly responsible for the dramatical transformation of economic theory 
after World War II. The rapid dissemination of mathematical methods, especially the axiomatic 
method, led to the emergence of mainstream economics (ME, henceforth) based on general 
equilibrium theory (GET, henceforth) and the marginalisation of other schools of economic 
thought which used non-mathematical languages for describing the economy. Thus, the language 
of mainstream economics, which is frequently extremely abstract and which does not shun highly 
unrealistic assumptions, became the demarcation line separating not only the “scientific” from 
“non-scientific” language, but also the “good” theories from “bad theories”. That was possible 
because language in economics is not merely a conventional code of signs which economists use 
to communicate with each other, but also part of the paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. Simply put, 
the language of economics determines, even if implicitly, the range of problems worth pursuing 
and the analytical toolbox for doing so. Thus, in this paper, the language of economics is treated as 
indistinguishable from the theoretical framework of economics, even though a precise description 
of interactions between the two may be an interesting problem on its own account.
Over the past 30 years, changes in economic theory, e.g. the popularization of the game 
theoretical framework, led to its greater differentiation, although pluralism in economics is 
still limited.2 Research approaches based on the concept of limited rationality, the behavioural 
approach, chaos theory, complexity, as well as experimental models spread in economics. These 
approaches use various research methodologies, however, the majority of them use a formal 
1  The starting point of this paper is hence pretty much the same as in our another recent contribution (Hardt 2009a), 
however, here the focus is precisely on language and the methodological reflection presented here has a deeper 
philosophical background. Nevertheless, readers interested in the historical background of developments in 
economics presented here are encouraged to read the above mentioned paper.
2  Here we distinguish between plurality and pluralism. The former simply means that we have many various theories 
(theoretical plurality), while the later denotes the situation in which the practitioners of the discipline treat plurality 
as something “good”, e.g. due to the fact that the diversity of theories enhances our explanatory capacity. 
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mathematical language and treat the economic system as being in equilibrium. Furthermore, 
modelling in terms of general equilibrium still plays a leading role in economics and most of 
the assumptions of mainstream economics are still not realistic (Hardt 2009a; Hardt 2010a). 
However, unrealistic assumptions do not always lead to unrealistic models. Consequently, the 
problem of the language(s) of economics and its inapplicability to reality has become more urgent 
in recent years.
This problem has additionally gained in importance in the face of the post 2008 global crisis, 
which not only came unpredicted by mainstream economics, but could also have been to some 
extent caused by it (Colander et al. 2009). This, in turn, raises the question whether it will be able to 
propose appropriate remedies. This situation was not only noticed by a group of participants in the 
public debate, but also by economists themselves, many of whom have recently published important 
articles on the analysis of the state of economics and the reasons for its crisis. Economists such as 
P. Krugman, J. Stiglitz, V. Smith, D. Acemoglu and others spoke out in this debate. Although they 
present different – sometimes even contradictory – opinions on the causes of the crisis and the 
possible ways in which it affects economic theory, the common element is their conviction that 
the language of economics is facing an unprecedented challenge, which could significantly affect 
the shape of economics in the near future. A good example of how different the views are on the 
direction in which economics should evolve is the dispute between Krugman (2009) and Cochrane 
(2009). In a somewhat overcritical opinion of the mainstream of economics, Krugman suggested 
that – both in the area of pure theory and economic policy – the only reasonable direction 
economics should take is, paradoxically, a return to Keynesianism. Keynes’ economic language, 
as Krugman argues, is not only the only language which allows to understand the current crisis, 
but is also free of mathematical formalism, behind which economic pseudoknowledge has been 
hiding until now. However, Cochrane maintains that, if – and here, he agrees with his adversary 
– inadequate consideration of various frictions, institutional conditions of markets and meanders 
of human behaviour are the reasons for the failure of economics, then the extent of the use of 
mathematics should be increased in the future rather than reduced. He argues that economics 
preferred to occupy itself with market “perfection” rather than “imperfection” because the former 
was simply easier to model and, therefore, the only true reform should involve the improvement of 
mathematical tools. The divergence of views regarding the current economic crisis and the role in 
it of the language of mainstream economics goes far beyond that. For instance, in a letter to Queen 
Elizabeth, British economists, Besley and Hennessy (2009) apologize for not being able to predict 
the oncoming crisis and blame their erroneous theory. In contrast, Saint-Paul (2009) believes that 
the task of economists is not, and should not be, to predict “rare systemic phenomena”, just like 
the task of good physicians is not to predict the diseases from which humanity will suffer in the 
future. Finally, according to Eichengreen (2009), the problem is not so much economics, which, 
as a science, gives many useful tools for analysing the causes of the crisis, but rather economists 
themselves, who experienced a unique cognitive blur. Therefore, it is the institutional environment 
and the incentives that economists and financiers face that should be reformed rather than the 
language in which the theory of economics is practiced. The disputes mentioned above and 
the differences in opinions confirm that studies on categorising reality through the language of 
economics in which economic theories are formulated, are not only important, but also highly 
topical and relevant.
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What lacks in the abovementioned contributions on the state of economics is a clear 
methodological agenda for analyzing the relation between theory and reality. Moreover, some 
authors commit very basic mistakes while investigating the interplay between language and the 
realm of empirical phenomena. The most common one is the belief that unrealistic assumptions 
make economic models unrealistic. However, in the philosophy of science no such a general claim 
is made. Here we assert that in many situations unrealistic assumptions make the very modelling 
possible. Moreover, some models based on unrealistic assumptions offer good descriptions of 
reality. Take for instance the Newtonian physics where we do not find any variables for friction. 
Does anyone blame Newton for not incorporating them? Or, does anyone accuse Newton of 
building unrealistic models due to unrealistic assumptions? Rather not, and there is a consensus 
in the philosophy of science that building models with perfectly realistic assumptions is not 
a methodological virtue. Moreover, a model with perfectly realistic assumptions would have the 
same practical value as a map with a scale of 1:1. One of the aims of this paper is, therefore, to shed 
some light on the issue of assumptions in economic models. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the current debate on the state of 
economics in the face of the global crisis. Section 3 starts a methodological analysis of that debate 
and is concentrated on the issue of assumptions. In section 4 we raise the question of how one can 
compare different economic theories and decide on their relative merit. Finally, in section 5, we 
comment on the very subject of criticism, namely the vision of contemporary economic theory its 
critics have. Section 6 offers some preliminary reflections on the need for a more philosophically 
oriented debate on the state of modern economics. Conclusions follow. 
2. Crisis in economy, crisis in economics?
The current global economic crises has provoked many questions on the validity of contemporary 
economic theory. Many economists are accusing economics of being a false mathematical science 
as for instance P. Krugman did while stating that “the economics profession went astray because 
economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth” (in his 
article How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? published in The New York Times). The debate on 
economics is very intensive and in many respects even emotional and to prove that it only suffices 
to cite the titles of the most important contributions on that subject, e.g. The Failure of the Economy 
& the Economists (B.M. Friedman in New York Review of Books), The Financial Crisis and the 
Systematic Failure of the Economics Profession (D. Colander et al. in Critical Review), The Great 
Crash of 2008 and the Reform of Economics (G. Hodgson in Cambridge Journal of Economics), 
The Crisis of 2008: Structural Lessons for and from Economics (D. Acemoglu in Critical Review), 
What Went Wrong with Economics (a debate in The Economist), Economics Crises (T. Lux in Nature 
Physics), and many more. In Poland the above debate has also been started recently with some 
articles in general journals (including the contributions by Hardt, Hockuba, Wiśniewski and 
Żylicz in Rzeczpospolita) as well as academic papers in the special issue of Studia Ekonomiczne on 
the state of economics in face of the global crisis (with contributions by Gradzewicz et al., Hardt, 
Jasiński, Kwaśnicki, Machaj, Pysz, and Żylicz). Not all of the texts mentioned above have the same 
importance. The one with high impact is for sure Krugman’s contribution which provoked a vivid 
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debate and a lot of polemics (we made a brief survey of that debate in the introduction). The main 
message of his paper is that economics prefers beauty (i.e. formal models) rather than truth. Below 
we cite the most important parts of his contribution and we underline the most interesting (and 
controversial) points he makes, i.e.:
(K1) “the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, 
clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth”
(K2) “the central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, 
intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical 
prowess”
(K3) “this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all 
the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that 
often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections 
of markets – especially financial markets – that can cause the economy’s operating system to 
undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe 
in regulation”.
(K4) “That is, they will have to acknowledge the importance of irrational and often unpredictable 
behaviour, face up to the often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant 
economic ‘theory of everything’ is a long way off”.
The above quotations from Krugman clearly show what we have noticed just earlier, namely that 
there was (maybe still is) a desire to unify economics on the basis of GET (“an all-encompassing, 
intellectually elegant approach” in K2). Also that economics has become a mathematical science 
(K1). Moreover, that having become a mathematical science economics somehow lost contact with 
reality. Next, he underlines the problem of unrealistic assumptions and claims that due to that fact 
economics is poorly equipped to analyse markets (K3). In the same vein is the K4 quotation where 
he focuses on the limited possibility of constructing an economic “theory of everything”, something 
obvious in the philosophy of science where the term “theory of everything” is just an oxymoron, 
especially if we are in the Hempel’s (1948) tradition. However, many Krugman’s claims are unclear. 
Take for instance his opinion reflected in quotations K3 and K4 where we find an implicit claim that 
unrealistic assumptions are (at least partially) responsible for unrealisticness of economic theories. 
However, he did not explain why would models with more realistic assumptions have a higher 
explanatory power. His statements about the role of mathematics in economics are even more 
unclear. The first message is that mathematics is per se something “bad” and responsible for the 
current crisis in economics. So, the more mathematics we have in economics, the more unrealistic 
models we have. But again, why does he claim so? Maybe, the truth is that while mathematics 
(as a whole) is not a problem, there is a problem with mathematics being badly used or with our use 
of inappropriate mathematical apparatus, as recently stated by Hodgson (2009, p. 1210): “the problem 
is not necessarily mathematics per se, but the obsession with technique over substance”. There is not 
such a reflection in Krugman’s paper. Paradoxically, one could claim that the mathematics we have 
in economics is too simple to offer analytical tools for investigating various imperfections of the 
markets. Consequently, in order to be more realistic we would probably have to incorporate a more 
advanced mathematical apparatus. We will come back to these issues later in section 5. 
Another interesting paper on the crises in economics is the one by Collander et al. (2009). 
That paper is of a more scientific character than Krugman’s contribution and it contains more 
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methodologically grounded analysis of the current state of economic theory. Collander’s paper is 
widely cited and the majority of authors writing on the impact of the crisis on economics make 
direct references to Collander’s work.3 The main message of his contribution is that we have 
a systematic failure of the economics profession. That failure is due to the inability of current 
models to describe the reality, namely to answer “why?” questions rather than simply the “what?” 
question. In other words, economics does not offer good explanations – “In our hour of greatest 
need, societies around the world are left to grope in the dark without a theory. That, to us, is 
a systemic failure of the economics profession” (Colander et. al 2009, 250). We give more quotations 
below to present Collander’s insights into the current state of economics (we underline the most 
important parts), i.e.:
(C1) “The failure of economists to anticipate and model the financial crisis has deep 
methodological roots” (p. 251). 
(C2) “Researchers have an ethical responsibility to point out to the public when the tools that 
they developed are misused” (p. 252).
(C3) “[…] analysis of these issues [of how market coordination is achieved] would require 
a different type of mathematics than that which is generally used in most prominent economic 
models” (p. 252).
(C4) “The representative-agent assumption in many current models in macroeconomics 
(including macro finance) means that modellers subscribe to the most extreme form of conceptual 
reductionism […]: By assumption, all concepts applicable to the macro sphere (i.e. the economy or 
its financial system) are fully reduced to concepts and knowledge in the lower-level domain of the 
individual agent” (p. 257).
(C5) “Once one acknowledges the importance of empirically based behavioural micro foundations 
and the heterogeneity of actors, a rich spectrum of new models becomes available” (p. 259).
(C6) “This occurred because such research was incompatible with the premise of the rational 
representative agent, which had come to be thought the only allowable model. That belief made the 
economics profession blind to the role of interactions and connections between actors” (p. 263).
Colander’s starting point is slightly different than Krugman’s, since Colander opens his paper 
with a clear C1 statement. Thus, methodology matters. Moreover, not only the state of economics 
is investigated but also the role of economists in developing modern economic theories (and 
policy recommendation) is analyzed (C2). As far as today’s issue is mainly with macroeconomics, 
Colander focuses on the relation between micro and macro. In his opinion a big mistake of modern 
macroeconomics is its conceptual reductionism, namely the assumption that the macro world is 
built of micro phenomena, and that there is a clear, deterministic relation between them. That is 
contrary to the long lasting antireductionist tradition in neoclassical economics built partially 
on the work of Marshall who in his Principles states the following: “As a cathedral is something 
more than the stones of which it is made, as a person is something more than a series of thoughts 
and feelings, so the life of society is something more than the sum of the lives of its individual 
members” (Book I, Charter I, Paragraph VI). Despite the fact that we had a strong movement in 
economics in favour of reductionism (the so-called microfoundations for macrotheory) in the 70’s, 
due partially to the implications of Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem, economists once again 
are becoming more cautious when it comes to the possibility of reducing macro to micro. However, 
3  “Access statistics” for that work are significant (see, e.g. http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/kudkuiedp/0903.htm). 
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due to a strong GET unificationist project macroeconomics has subscribed to the conceptual 
reductionism described in C4. Colander’s point made in C5 requires also a comment. Here an 
implicit claim is that more realistic assumptions would result in new (and probably better) 
models. However, in the entire paper Colander does not define precisely what “new” (or better) 
models mean. There is only a very general conviction that better models (and economics) should 
be “closer” to reality. Finally, in C6 Colander claims that systemic failure of economics is the 
result of unifying economics on the basis of rational representative agent. Although Colander’s 
paper has a greater methodological depth than Krugman’s, still some methodological issues are 
neglected. They are disregarded not only in the two above described papers, but also in other 
studies mentioned at the beginning. We list them below and in the subsequent sections we offer 
a deeper analysis. 
First, there is the issue of assumptions. Both papers share the view that models with more 
realistic assumptions are simply better models (see K3 and C5). Second, there is an implicit belief 
that “new economics”, based on more realistic assumptions, would be better than the current 
theory. However, both authors do not define what “better” means. Third, in both papers there are 
clear statements that the current state of economics results mainly from theoretical unification 
based on the GET approach (see K2 and C6), also in both papers there is a desire to start the process 
of ontological unification in economics, namely a unification based on ontologically important 
concepts (e.g. C5)4. Last, but not least, the issue of mathematization5 of economics is raised and 
should be analyzed jointly with the topic of theoretical unification and unrealistic assumptions, 
since the mathematization is a by-product of the two. 
3. Realistic models with unrealistic assumptions?
What is often raised in the ongoing debate on the state of economics is the opinion that models 
we have are unrealistic due to unrealistic assumptions and hence the way to improve economic 
modelling is by making our assumptions more realistic. That is contrary, for instance, to the 
main message from Friedman’s (1953) (F53, henceforth) influential paper where he clearly stated 
that “economic theories should not be judged by their assumptions but by their predictive 
implications […], the unrealisticness of the assumptions of a theory is no reason for complaint 
or worry about the theory”. It is worth defining more precisely here what we mean by the 
unrealisticness of the assumptions of a theory. A good starting point here is to use the deductive-
nomological model of explanation where unrealisticness of the assumptions is a characteristic 
of the explanans.6 In other words, the more unrealistic our theories are, the more sentences are 
4  Theoretical unification is understood here as “a matter of unifying previously separate theories by means of one that 
possesses all (or most of) their explanatory content” (Marchionni 2009, p. 13). Here we treat ontological unification 
as “[…] a matter of discovering a real unity in the world by way of redescribing apparently independent and diverse 
phenomena as manifestations (outcomes, phases, forms, aspects) of one and the same small number of entities, 
causes, mechanisms, processes” (Marchionni, Mäki 2009, p. 190).
5  The term “mathematization of economics” has a narrower scope than “formalization of economics”, since formalization 
has three meanings, i.e. axiomatisation, mathematization and a third category that can be termed methodological 
formalization (Backhouse 1998, p. 1848). In this paper we refer only to mathematization due to the general opinion 
that formalization equals mathematization, however, we should have in mind the above Backhouse’s definition. 
6  The explanans is defined as the set of sentences (explaining items) responsible for answering the questions present in 
the explanandum (the set of sentences describing the phenomena to be explained) (Hempel et al. 1948, pp. 136–137). 
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excluded from the explanans. Consequently, we use a restricted set of sentences for explaining 
the phenomena described in the explanandum. However, the importance of particular sentences 
in the explanans is not the same. Some sentences explain more, some less. Therefore, we 
may have two theories both with five elements in the explanans but with different levels of 
realisticness, e.g. theory 1 (T1) with 3 ontologically relevant sentences and 2 irrelevant is more 
realistic (in terms of assumptions) that theory 2 (T2) with 2 ontologically relevant sentences 
and 3 irrelevant. Therefore, the above claim – the more unrealistic our theories are, the more 
sentences are excluded from the explanans, holds for theories that include sentences in the 
explanans with the same level of ontological importance. That is coherent with the very meaning 
of realisticness, namely the compatibility of theories (assumptions) and reality. The above is 
nicely explained by Friedman who claims that “Most phenomena are driven by a very few central 
forces. What a good theory does is to simplify, it pulls the central forces and gets rid of the rest” 
(Snowdon, Vane 1997, p. 196). The simplification means isolation, namely we isolate our models 
from the processes we treat as unimportant.7 That is the case of Newtonian mechanics where 
the very basic model is isolated from the influence of frictions. For that reason the question we 
ask should not be – why we neglect so many issues in our models, but we should ask whether 
we exclude unimportant issues and include the substantial ones. In other words, the issue is not 
the method of isolation per se but the question what we are abstracting from. Models should be 
simple, with many isolations (i.e. unrealistic assumption) but with many crucial forces, and as 
it was observed by R. Solow “the very complexity of real life … [is what] makes simple models 
so necessary” (Solow 2001, p. 111). Paraphrasing Solow one could say that we need unrealistic 
assumptions in order to cope with the complexity. 
The reader of this article should not have an impression that the more simple (unrealistic) 
a given model is, the better explanations it offers. That claim is often described as a strong version 
of F53 thesis and it must be mistaken (see, e.g. Mäki 2009a, p. 95). The unrealisticness should not be 
treated as a methodological virtue despite the fact that sometimes violating the (whole) truth may 
be desirable, e.g. in assuming that all firms are maximizing profits. If we would agree with a strong 
version of F53 thesis, then, for instance, instead of choosing theories with firms maximizing their 
profits we should prefer theories with firms maximizing the loses (the more unrealistic assumption 
than the one of profit maximization, since firms generally try to increase profits). Therefore, that 
assumption of loses maximization does not have any epistemic value and hence the strong version 
of F53 thesis should be questioned. 
Summing-up the above discussion, we subscribe to the following statement by Mäki: “There is 
no general problem with unrealistic models with unrealistic assumptions or the method of isolation 
by idealization. This means that the locus of appropriate criticism of any chunk of economics does 
not mostly lie at the level of general philosophical description of method, but rather at the level of 
how the method is used and how its use is constrained and what results it produces” (Mäki 2009b, 
p. 93). Therefore, one cannot claim that economic models poorly describe reality due to unrealistic 
assumptions. The issue is more complex and requires more methodological insights as the ones 
offered above. In that sense, some authors claiming that economics went wrong due (mainly) to 
unrealistic assumptions are simply not right. 
7  For the simplification of our arguments we treat isolation as idealization. 
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4. Comparing the incomparable. Problems in appraising economic theories 
The methodological issues described above become even more complex if we focus on the 
problem of comparing different theories. We do it constantly and we often say that a given 
theory is better than another one, e.g. Krugman and others cited above claim that more realistic 
theories are better than the unrealistic ones. However, there is no universal measure of the 
“goodness” (or “power”) of theories, e.g. in Hempel’s (1948) approach “[…] the systemic power 
of a theory T will be reflected in the ratio of the amount of information derivable by means 
of T to the amount of initial information required for that derivation” (164). Therefore, the 
more powerful a given theory is, the more kinds of events it explains while trying to restrict 
the size of its explanans. The virtue of explaining much by little emerges and that forms the 
methodological foundation for the idea of explanatory unification, including the GET based 
unification in economics. In other words, explanations reduce to the fundamental core and 
hence in writing the casual histories of events we reach the basic cause or mechanism, e.g. 
the principle of economizing on transaction costs in transaction cost economics. In this 
view unification simply equals explanation, while many others claim that unification and 
explanation are separate issues. For instance, Morrison (2000) claims that there is a trade-off 
between unification and precision (of explanations), i.e. the more a given theory is unified, the 
less precise explanations it offers. What is rather clear in the modern philosophy of science is 
that the issue of unification and explanation is rather complex and the two should be studied 
separately. Moreover, the explanatory power can have many dimensions, e.g. the two (precision 
and scope) mentioned above. Consequently, there is no objective and “aggregated” measure 
of explanatory power. What dimension of explanatory power is more important is often the 
sole decision of the researcher who is driven by pragmatic reasons, e.g. if he is interested in 
precision, he will choose theories offering more precise descriptions of the explanans. As a 
result, we do not have a good tool for comparing different theories. In that context, comparisons 
of different economic theories that appear in many papers on the state of economics are not 
methodologically grounded since comparisons should be made in precisely defined dimensions 
(e.g. precision, or the familiarity of the explanans) rather than in general terms. General 
comparisons are simply methodologically wrong. 
5. Criticizing economics, but which economics?
Last, but not least, the issue of the growing popularity of mathematics in economics is worth 
commenting on. According to Krugman the mathematization is per se a problem and the reason 
for mistaking beauty for truth. The above discussion proves that such a strong criticism is not 
methodologically grounded and that the problem is not mathematics as such but the way we 
use mathematical tools when isolating the explanans and the explanandum. The reason for the 
emergence of non-realistic models is not the formal mathematical language alone. The problem 
is not the complexity of mathematics but the wrong use of the method of idealization and the 
exclusion of ontologically important elements from the explanans. Also the problem is that we 
often use wrong mathematical methods as it is clearly stated in C3. However, the problem with 
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mathematics is that its popularity makes economists more likely to include in the explanans 
the elements that can be mathematically modelled rather than the elements impossible to 
operationalize. In that sense mathematics is partially responsible for excluding ontologically 
important concepts from economic theories. The above is claimed for instance by T. Lawson who 
states the following: “Social reality, in other words, is of nature that is significantly at variance 
with the closed systems of isolated atoms that would guarantee the conditions of mathematical 
deductivist modelling” (2009, p. 765). However, what is disputable in the above quotation is 
a strong claim that mathematical modelling is of a deductivist nature and that a closed systems 
of isolated atoms is a necessary condition for this kind of modelling. If you are to take the 
mathematics from the original work of Arrow-Debreu, then Lawson is probably right, but if you 
take the game theory or the mathematical theory of chaos, then mathematical modelling is not 
necessarily deductivist and it is not required for the system to be a closed one. Consequently, the 
issue of mathematization is rather complex but for sure it is not true that the mathematics alone 
“led the economics astray”.
What should be added here is the issue of the kind of economics that is under critique. 
While reading Krugman’s contribution one can have the impression that his vision of economics 
is somehow one-dimensional, as he does not mention such branches of modern mainstream 
economics as behavioural economics, transaction cost economics, new institutional economics, 
or experimental economics. The same holds for Colander’s paper, but to a lesser extent. Krugman 
often equates economics to neoclassical economics, however, the modern mainstream economics 
is no longer the neoclassical one only. Contemporary mainstream is more diversified with 
approaches containing realistic assumptions (e.g. behavioral economics), approaches with 
solid empirical studies (e.g. new institutional economics), or branches based on the grounds of 
ontological unification (e.g. transaction costs economics). The growing diversification of economics 
led Colander to declare in 2000 that “the term neoclassical economics [is] dead” (Colander 2000, 
p. 127). Consequently, the critique of economics in the face of post-2008 crisis should be treated as 
directed at the neoclassical economics and not on the modern mainstream as a whole. Moreover, 
some authors also have a text book picture of neoclassicism (e.g. Keen 2002). Take here for instance 
the claims that economics does not offer insightful comments on the issue of managers realizing 
their own interests rather than the ones of the owners. However, in many works from the 60’s 
we can find models using neoclassical apparatus explaining the divergence of behavior between 
managers and owners (e.g. Alchian 1965). 
Last, but not least, the issue of ontological unification should be raised. At the background of 
Krugman’s K1 statement there is an assumption that economics prefers beauty (here: formalism) 
than truth, i.e. theories with ontologically important explaining items but with limited ability 
of being “translated” into formal, mathematical language. However, in contemporary economics 
we find many examples of theories driven by the desire to “open the black box, and displaying 
the secret, internal machinery that governs the social event that is the object of our enquiry” 
(Rios 2004, p. 52). Take here the example of transaction cost economics where the secret is 
the fundamental message of TCE, i.e. that the emerging organizational forms result from the 
existence of transaction costs. In other words, trading parties choose the contracting schema that 
is characterised by the lowest possible level of transaction costs. Moreover, the concept of TCs is, 
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according to Williamson, a one with high ontic importance,8 i.e. transaction costs are crucial to 
the functioning of the market system. If you exclude transaction costs, you cannot see; and “the 
element [here: transaction costs] to be added is not just casually influential, it is necessary for 
the functioning of the system” (Mäki 2001, p. 381). This is coherent with the Coasean statement 
that “there were costs of making transactions in a market economy and that it was necessary to 
incorporate them in the analysis” (Coase 1993, p. 46). The above is in line with Coase’s essentialist 
spirit, namely his claim that the aim of theorizing is “to get to the essence of what [is] going on 
in the economic system” (Coase 1988a, 68). Coase and Williamson do not claim, however, that 
the ontic importance of transaction costs means that the whole economic theory should now 
be built around that concept. They accept plurality, namely that we may have many projects of 
ontological unification that try to identify important explaining items: “No doubt other factors 
should be also added” (Coase 1988b, p. 30). In modern economics we can find some examples 
of such projects of unification, e.g. Richardson’s approach of incorporating considerations of 
information into neoclassical economics and his treatment of information as “one of the essential 
elements” (Richardson 1960, p. 23), and even more than that, as can be seen in his assertion that 
“by neglecting the whole problem of information, the perfect competition model condemns itself 
not only to unrealism but to inadequacy even as a hypothetical system” (Richardson 1960, p. 69). 
The above discussion of TCE and Richardson’s approach should be treated just as an illustration 
of ontological unifications and not as the claim that these two approaches have played a decisive 
role in the recent changes in economic theory.9
The above shows us that economics is searching not only for beauty, but also for truth. 
Mechanistic explanations are important in many branches of contemporary economics. The role 
of that kind of explanations is underlined in the causal mechanical model of explanations where 
“Casual processes, casual interactions, and casual laws provide the mechanisms by which the world 
works; to understand “why” certain things happen, we need to see “how” they are produced by 
these mechanisms” (Salmon 1984, p. 132). More and more social philosophers agree that mechanical 
explanations should be widely used in social sciences, including economics (cf. Woodward 2009). 
So again, the critics of modern economics underestimate the role casual mechanical models play 
in economics. Moreover, they somehow criticize only the language of economics (mathematics) 
and not the essence of a given model which is formulated using mathematical terms. Finally, one 
may even conclude that many critics of economics do not offer an adequate critique of mainstream 
economics but rather a critique of their own vision of economics which might have been true in 
the 60’s or the 70’s but which is incorrect nowadays. 
8  It is important to define precisely what we are conceptualizing here under the notion of ontic importance. First, 
ontic differs from ontological. Ontic is related to the particular characteristics of a given thing that are essential for 
its existence. Also, we may talk about ontic elements of a particular scientific theory, e.g. in physics atoms are ontic. 
Therefore, when we say that atoms are objects with high ontic importance in physics we just claim that they are 
essential in that particular area of scientific investigation. Even more, they are not only essential but also ontically 
indispensable. Thus, claiming that atoms are ontic elements of physics does not mean that we are asking (or should 
ask) more fundamental questions about their existence, precisely ontological questions. In the case of TCE the fact 
that transaction costs are ontically important results from the fact that the central unit of analysis is the transaction 
and the cost of transacting is an important characteristic of the later. 
9  Readers interested in the role TCE played in the developments of modern economics are encouraged to read, e.g. Hardt 
(2009b; 2010b) or Klaes (2000a; 2000b).
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6. A plea for more methodological studies in economics
The above discussion clearly shows that what is lacking in the debate on the state of modern 
economics is a well defined methodological apparatus for investigating such issues as explanatory 
power, realisticness of assumptions, and the role of idealizations we make in building economic 
models. That is why the debate on the state of economics is so fragmented and lacking in conclusive 
outcome. Moreover, quite often authors with extensive experience in empirical research have very 
little competence in investigating the language in which they describe reality. It turns out that 
investigating the descriptions of reality is often more difficult than analyzing the reality per se, 
however, looking at economics from the perspective of the philosophy of science is unavoidable if 
we want to understand what is really going on. 
Furthermore, not only the language should be studied but economic theories in their relation to 
reality as well. This is particularly important nowadays when many postmodernists would argue 
that there is not any connection between the real world and descriptions thereof. In that sense they 
attack the whole philosophical tradition of constructing explanations based on the logical relation 
between the explanans and the explanandum (e.g. D. McCloskey’s rhetorical analysis of economics). 
The research perspective we are taking is different – it is realistic. Thus we claim that language can 
describe the true and objective reality, and hence that Hempel’s model is generally right. In claiming 
that we subscribe to the Wittgensteinian thesis that “the questions that we raise and our doubts depend 
on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt” (Wittgenstein 1969, §341). The propositions 
that are exempt from doubt are “these central elements […] taken as presuppositions, as relatively 
absolute absolutes, and, as such, they become, themselves, the constraints (the constitution) within 
which the scientific discourse is conducted” (Buchanan 1991, pp. 13–14). The search for the absolute 
of absolutes should define the future research practice of economics. Consequently, more studies in 
economic ontology are needed. Ontology is defined here as “the study of being as being, of the most 
general characteristics of all things, whether actual, possible, or even impossible, whether physical, 
mental, or social” (Mäki 2001, p. 7). The current debate on the state of economics should inspire us 
to a more in-depth reflection about the most general and fundamental mechanisms governing the 
markets. It could be that a modern economics having become so diversified somehow lost the ability 
to pose fundamental questions. It is to be hoped that the debate on the state of economics would make 
economists more sensitive to methodological questions. 
7. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the current debate on the state of economics in the face of 
the 2008–2009 global crisis. We have shown that the debate itself is very fragmented and not firmly 
rooted in methodological ground. Thus the conclusions participants are arriving at are often wrong, 
e.g. the one that unrealistic assumptions alone make economic models unrealistic. Moreover, and 
paradoxically, although the critics of economics accuse the queen of social sciences of using 
too much mathematics and hence of using the wrong language, the critics themselves apply an 
inadequate language while writing on economics since the majority of them simply do not employ 
the approach of the philosophy of science. Writing conclusively on the state of economics without 
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knowing the recent developments in the philosophy of science is nearly impossible. Consequently, 
probably due to the above-described lack of interest in the philosophy of science some papers are 
overly critical in their descriptions of economics as merely a science fallen astray. The criticism 
presented in methodologically richer papers, e.g. Colander’s contribution, is more nuanced and 
focused on particular characteristics of modern economics. However, economists still have a lot of 
problems while debating the issues of assumptions, explanations, explanatory power, realisticness 
of models, and more generally the relation between economics (theory) and economy (empiria). 
More in-depth studies on these issues are advisable as much for their own sake as in order to equip 
economists with appropriate tools to deal with criticism that economics is facing. 
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